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ESSAY
COPY-PASTE PRECEDENT
Brian Soucek*
I. INTRODUCTION
Precedential opinions are written to be cited, quoted, and
followed. This essay identifies another kind of "precedent":
unpublished opinions that are followed without being either
cited or quoted. These decisions shape the course of the law not
because they are binding-they explicitly are not-but simply
because portions of their text get repeatedly copied and pasted
into other unpublished opinions. "Copy-paste precedent" ends
up having the influence of precedent without real precedent's
authority--or scrutiny.
If a decision's influence is measured by the number of
times it appears in case law, copy-paste precedent can
sometimes have even more influence than a circuit's
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This essay was written, drawing
exclusively on publicly accessible information, before the author's clerkship commenced;
the views here are entirely his own, not those of his judge or any other member of the
Court of Appeals. The author wishes to thank Adam Chandler, Rebecca Crootof, Denny
Curtis, Josh Meltzer, Jonathan Neufeld, Mark Noferi, Helen O'Reilly, Alex Platt, Judith
Resnik, Allison Tait, and Daniel Winik for many helpful comments; he dedicates this essay
on judicial procedure and writing to the memory of a man who loved both: his former
judge, the Honorable Mark Kravitz.
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precedential opinions on the same subject. To show this, I focus
here on an example from a burgeoning area of unpublished case
law-immigration-in the Second Circuit, a court that last year
decided a full ninety-seven percent of its immigration cases
through unpublished summary orders.' My example concerns an
issue that has lately attracted Congressional attention and led to
a deepening circuit split: the visibility required of social groups
under asylum law.2 The example is notable not least because it is
wrong.
On one level, this is to say that the copy-paste precedent
discussed below is substantively mistaken. The text that keeps
getting copied and pasted into ever more unpublished summary
orders diverges in a significant way from the Second Circuit's
official doctrine. This point is not unimportant, given the fact
that another asylum application is affected each time the
mistaken text gets copied and pasted.
Worse, correcting a mistake like this in copy-paste
precedent is at once less and more difficult than correcting one
that is published. Unpublished opinions are less difficult to
correct because they are not binding; yet they are also less likely
to be corrected, because no one thinks to do so. The errors of
unpublished opinions, even when they are discovered, are not
thought to self-replicate as precedential ones do. Why then
correct something which, it is assumed, will not guide future
opinions?
In a world of copy-paste precedent, this last assumption
fails to hold. Unpublished opinions do guide the opinions that
follow, but troublingly, not as deliberately, and not nearly as
openly, as precedential opinions do. This is the more significant,
procedural sense in which the copy-paste precedent discussed in
this essay is mistaken: It makes law the wrong way.
1. In 2012, the Second Circuit decided 582 appeals from decisions of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, the administrative body within the Department of Justice responsible
for adjudicating immigration claims. The Second Circuit published opinions in fifteen of
those cases. Search in WestLaw CTA2 library, using the search "'board of immigration
appeals' & da(2012)," further narrowed by "% 'not selected for publication' (Feb. 25,
2013) (yielding 585 hits before narrowing, three of which are cases that mention the BIA
but are not themselves BIA appeals, and fifteen hits after narrowing; results on file with
author).
2. See Refugee Protection Act of 2011, Sen. 1202, 112th Cong. § 5(a) (June 15, 2011)
(revising the meaning of "particular social group" within the definition of "refugee"); see
also nn. 35-36, infra, and accompanying text (describing the circuit split).
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The point of this essay is thus to correct a mistake in the
Second Circuit's case law, but it is not merely that. The broader
aim is to call attention to an unacknowledged and mistaken way
in which law gets made-not just in the Second Circuit, but,
potentially, throughout the eighty-five percent of cases that the
federal courts of appeals now decide through unpublished
opinions.3
II. UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
Unpublished opinions, as judges and lawyers well know,
are nothing of the kind. Not only are they published in the
Federal Appendix, but they are fully searchable on commercial
databases and available-as required by law4-on appellate
courts' websites. Since the controversial Rule 32.1 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure went into effect in
December 2006, courts may no longer prevent liti ants from
citing unpublished opinions issued in 2007 and later. Thus, the
only real difference between published and unpublished
opinions is that unpublished opinions do not have precedential
effect. A federal appellate court's unpublished opinions do not
bind either that circuit's trial courts or its future appellate panels.
Unpublished opinions are a relatively recent feature of the
federal courts. It wasn't until 1973 that the Advisory Council on
Appellate Justice recommended that the circuits establish
publication plans to limit the number of published opinions and
3. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the U.S Courts
2011, at Table S-3, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx (click on
"Judicial Business 2011" on main page, then click "Supplemental Tables," then click
"Table S-3") (accessed Jan. 15, 2013; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process) [hereinafter Judicial Business 2011].
4. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501 n. § 205(a)(5) (2004) ("Federal Courts") (requiring court
websites to provide "[aiccess to the substance of all written opinions issued by the court,
regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the official court reporter, in a
text searchable format") (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
5. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a)(ii) (Westlaw 2012); see Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of
Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 23-24
(2005) (noting that during the rulemaking process, Proposed Rule 32.1 received the
second-highest number of comments of any rule ever proposed).
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to restrict parties' ability to cite to those not published.6 Each
circuit had done so by 1974.
The current rule in the Second Circuit dictates that "[w]hen
a decision in a case is unanimous and each panel judge believes
that no jurisprudential purpose is served by an opinion (i.e., a
ruling having precedential effect), the panel may rule by
summary order."8 In the year ending September 30, 2011, the
Second Circuit resolved 88.7 percent of its cases through such
unpublished summary orders.9 The percentage is even higher for
immigration cases, most of which are routed to the court's Non-
Argument Calendar. There, in lieu of oral argument, judges
receive summary orders drafted by staff attorneys and decide
whether to sign the proposed orders or to send the cases to the
regular calendar for argument.10 Whether argued or not, ninety-
seven percent of the court's immigration cases were decided by
summary order in 2012.11
The wisdom and even the constitutionality of this
arrangement have been heavily contested.12  Supporters of
unpublished opinions cite the growing caseload of the courts of
appeals, the inability of judges to give precedent-worthy
consideration to so many cases, the need to keep the law
coherent and control the proliferation of case law, and the fact
that many cases require judges simply to apply the law rather
than make new law. Opponents claim that the rule of law and
the "judicial power" granted under the Constitution both require
6. See David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning
Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. App. Prac. & Process 61, 63-64 (2009).
7. Id.
8. 2d Cir. I.O.P. 32.1.1(a) (2009).
9. See Judicial Business 2011, supra n. 3, at Table S-3.
10. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 Duke L.J. 315, 349-50 (2011).
11. See supra n. 1.
12. For extensive listings of articles debating the wisdom and constitutionality of
unpublished opinions, see Cleveland, supra n. 6, at 62 n. 5, 107 n. 273, 129-30 nn. 354-
55; Amy E. Sloan, If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em: A Pragmatic Approach to
Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 895, 896-97
nn. 2-11 (2008); Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and
New Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 705, 705 n. 5 (2006). The
constitutionality of non-precedential decisionmaking was debated within the federal courts
in Anastasoff v. US., 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (R.S. Arnold, J.), vacated on other
grounds, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000), and Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.
2001) (Kozinski, J.).
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that opinions have binding effect; they doubt whether judges can
accurately determine which of their opinions are important
enough to publish; they worry that non-publication is an attempt
to shield opinions from review; and they fear for those litigants
whose cases are, by judges' own admission, given less care and
attention than those whose cases are decided through published
opinions.
My goal here is not to repeat or add to the extensive debate
about the value of unpublished, non-precedential decisions.
Instead, it is to show how decisions that are formally non-
precedential can, in practice, end up playing the role of
precedent. To do so, I turn to the Federal Appendix-the
repository of the federal appellate courts' unpublished case
law-in order to look at a series of recent Second Circuit
decisions on the subject of asylum, social groups, and visibility.
III. SOCIAL GROUPS AND VISIBILITY IN ASYLUM LAW
To obtain asylum in the United States, an applicant
generally must show a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
one of five reasons: race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
or "membership in a particular social group. The last of these
is the least well understood; in the words of the Department of
Justice-the agency charged with interpreting the phrase-it is
"universally recognized to be ambiguous." 4
In a 1985 opinion, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
construed "particular social group" to require some "common,
immutable characteristic . . . that the members of the group
either cannot change, or should not be required to change
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences."' 5 The Second Circuit added to this definition in
1991, requiring that group members share a "characteristic in
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1 58(a)(2)(A) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
14. Br. of Respt., Gaitan v. Holder, http://www.ilcm.org/docunents/litigationseg/CA8-
10-1724_Gaitan_v_Holderbrf O[L.pdf at 22 (No. 10-1724, 671 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012))
(accessed Jan. 16, 2013; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
15. In re Acosta, 19 . & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds,
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987), abrogated on other grounds,
Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997).
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common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a
persecutor-or in the eyes of the outside world in general."1 6
Quoting the Second Circuit's decision, the BIA specified in
2006 that social-group claims require a showing of something it
called "social visibility" "-that is, "the extent to which
members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in
question as members of a social group."18 The Second Circuit
deferred to the BIA's interpretation of "particular social group"
twice in 2007, in two precedential decisions that show no
awareness of one another.19
Running through these opinions is a crucial ambiguity
between two interpretations of "social visibility." On the one
hand, the opinions look to whether a given group is "perceived
as a group by society."20 This cognitive approach considers how
a society thinks of itself as being carved up into various groups
and guards against the invention of ad hoc groups proposed
solely for the purpose of asylum applications.2 1  The second
approach takes visibility literally, requiring that the
characteristic uniting the group be "highly visible and
16. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit has since
clarified, if not repudiated, a second holding in Gomez that had seemed to preclude the
recognition of groups defined by "broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender."
Id.; see also Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2007) (pointing out that
the Circuit had "recently clarified that the best reading of Gomez is one that is consistent
with Acosta" and that "Gomez should be read as standing for the proposition that an
individual will not qualify for asylum if he or she fails to show a risk of future persecution
on the basis of the membership claimed in the particular social group"). Authors of the
Second Circuit's unpublished summary orders have occasionally failed to note this
clarification. See e.g. Kauzonaite v. Holder, 351 Fed. Appx. 529, 531 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing
Gomez); Xiao Fen Lian v. Holder, 313 Fed. Appx. 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2009) (same).
17. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006).
18. Id.; see also id. at 959-61 (discussing "social visibility" of groups composed of
former drug informants).
19. Compare Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (decided Nov.
21, 2007) (discussing "social visibility" and the use of "well-defined boundaries" when
determining membership in the group at issue) with Koudriachova, 490 F.3d at 261-62
(decided June 26, 2007) (discussing groups "united by some shared past experience," and
noting that "the BIA has adopted a broad definition of particular social group," so "courts
must examine closely whether the persecution the applicant fears derives primarily from
his or her status as a member of that particular social group").
20. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007) (quoting definition
of "particular social group" used by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees); see
also C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956 (same).
21. See Brian Soucek, Student Author, Social Group Asylum Claims: A Second Look at
the New Visibility Requirement, 29 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 337, 342 (2010).
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recognizable by others in the country in question."22 The
difference between the two approaches comes down to society's
"seeing" (in a metaphorical sense) those who share a
characteristic as being part of some group, versus seeing (in the
literal sense, with one's eyes) some characteristic shared by
members of the group.
When the Second Circuit published its two opinions
deferring to the BIA's interpretation of "particular social group,"
it clearly had the cognized-group approach in mind.
Koudriachova, the first of these opinions, defined visibility as
"the extent to which members of society perceive those with the
relevant characteristic as members of a social group."23
Likewise, Ucelo-Gomez, the second opinion, stressed that
"'persecutory action toward a group may be a relevant factor in
determining [its] visibility." 2  Presumably the court did not
mean that persecutory action produces literally visible
characteristics (though, sadly, that sometimes happens); the
court surely meant that persecution of a group provides good
evidence that people think of it as a group.
Since these two opinions, the Second Circuit has mentioned
social groups and visibility in only four more published
opinions, 25 just two of which give the concept more than passing
notice. The language that Koudriachova took almost verbatim
from the BIA has only been quoted once in any Second Circuit
opinion. Not one of the Second Circuit's thirty unpublished
summary orders that discuss social visibility quotes the
definition given in the court's first precedential statement on the
subject.
22. C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 960; see also A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 74
(noting that "the shared characteristic of the group should generally be recognizable by
others in the community").
23. Koudriachova, 490 F.3d at 261 (emphasis added).
24. Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F. 3d at 73 (referring to discussion in C-A-).
25. See Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99 (2d
Cir. 2008); Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Gashi v.
Holder, 702 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussed in n. 63, infra).
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IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S UNPUBLISHED
SOCIAL-GROUP "PRECEDENT"
Instead of quoting Koudriachova's precedential statement
on the meaning of social visibility, the first of the Second
Circuit's thirty summary orders on the subject, Romero v.
Mukasey,26 explained the newly adopted requirements for social
groups in its own words: "[I]n order to constitute a particular
social group, a proposed group must (1) exhibit a shared
characteristic that is socially visible to others in the community,
and (2) be defined with sufficient particularity." 27
Romero's gloss on the first of the two requirements
diverged from the language of the BIA's and Second Circuit's
precedential opinions in ways that are subtle, but significant.28
The BIA opinion cited in Romero provided that the shared
characteristic "should generally be recognizable by others in the
community."29 Romero replaced the more ambiguous
"recognizable" with "visible." Moreover, Romero required that
this visible characteristic be "exhibit[ed]"-a word not found in
either the BIA's or the Second Circuit's opinions. Finally, where
Second Circuit precedent had talked of the social group's
visibility,30  the Romero test required the group's shared
characteristic to be socially visible. All three of these changes
tipped the definition significantly toward the literalist reading of
visibility.
This turn toward literalism made no difference in Romero
itself, because Romero won in the Court of Appeals. 3 1 But this is
26. 262 Fed. Appx. 328 (2d Cir. 2008).
27. Id. at 330 (citing A-M-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 74-76)
28. The BIA held "that the shared characteristic of the group should generally be
recognizable by others in the community." A-M-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 74. The Second
Circuit held that membership in a purported social group requires a certain level of "social
visibility" and the definition of the social group must have particular and "well-defined
boundaries." Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73.
29. A-M-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 74.
30. See Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73 ("[P]ersecutory action toward a group may be a
relevant factor in determining the visibility of a group in a particular society.").
31. Romero, 262 Fed. Appx. at 333 (deeming the proposed social group--wealthy
Colombian land and business owners-dissimilar enough from "wealthy Guatemalans," a
group that the BIA and Second Circuit had previously refused to recognize, and remanding
to the BIA for further consideration).
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where the copying and pasting began. The Romero gloSS 32
appears verbatim in eleven separate unpublished Second Circuit
summary orders entered from January 2008 to April 2012-
nearly a third of the cases in which the Second Circuit has ever
defined visibility in the context of social groups. If a precedent's
importance is measured by the number of times it gets repeated,
Romero is easily the most important "precedent" on this subject
in the Second Circuit. Yet Romero, as an unpublished summary
order, has never been cited by the Second Circuit.
Unfortunately, the Romero gloss is not the only instance of
copying and pasting within this set of opinions. An additional
formulation of the visibility requirement first appeared in Xiao
Fen Lian in March 200933 and then reappeared in four
subsequent summary orders, most recently in May 2012. It held
that "membership in the group must entail a level of 'social
visibility' sufficient to identify members to others in the
community, particularly to potential persecutors." 34 Note the
crucial language here: Social visibility requires that there be
something "sufficient to identify members" of the group to the
public. Once again, the language suggests a literalist reading of
32. See n. 26, supra, and accompanying text.
33. See 313 Fed. Appx. at 395. Xiao Fen Lian also relies upon a quotation from
Gomez-precluding the use of a definition of social groups rooted in "broadly-based
characteristics such as youth and gender"-that ceased to be good law in the Second
Circuit in 2006. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing
Gomez and Acosta, but declining to "decide the exact scope of Gomez ... because Gao
belongs to a particular social group that shares more than a common gender"), vacated and
remanded, sub nom Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007); see also Koudriachova, 490 F.3d
at 262.
34. Xiao Fen Lian, 313 Fed. Appx. at 395; see also Paucar-Sarmiento v. Holder, 482
Fed. Appx. 656, 658 (2d Cir. 2012) ("A 'particular social group' must: (1) 'share a
common, immutable characteristic' that has a level of 'social visibility' sufficient to
identify members to others in the community, particularly to potential persecutors; and (2)
be defined with sufficient particularity."); Oliva-Flores v. Holder, 477 Fed. Appx. 774, 775
(2d Cir. 2012) (noting first that "[a] cognizable social group must: (1) exhibit a shared
characteristic that is socially visible to others in the community; and (2) be defined with
sufficient particularity," and then also that "[t]he 'social visibility' test requires that the
shared traits that characterize the social group be sufficient to identify members of that
group to others in the community, particularly to potential persecutors"); Riano v. Holder,
358 Fed. Appx. 251, 253 (2d Cir. 2009) (asserting that group characteristic "must also
entail a level of 'social visibility' sufficient to identify members to others in the
community, particularly to potential persecutors . . . and must also "be defined with
sufficient particularity") (citations omitted); Kauzonaite, 351 Fed. Appx. at 531. Oliva-
Flores is especially notable because it copies and pastes both the Romero gloss and the
language from Xiao Fen Lian into a single paragraph.
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visibility---equating it with something that can be seen. Like the
often-copied Romero gloss, then, this too requires social-group
members to exhibit a trait that even passing strangers could
discern.35
As three circuits have now held, this reading of social
visibility "makes no sense."36 Moreover, the Solicitor General
told the Supreme Court in 2010 that this literalist interpretation
is wrong, pointing out that the BIA's precedential decisions
have equated "social visibility" with the extent to which the
relevant society perceives there to be a group in the first
place, rather than the ease with which one may necessarily
be able to identify particular individuals as members of
such a group.37
35. Cf Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the
notion that "you can be a member of a particular social group only if a complete stranger
could identify you as a member if he encountered you in the street, because of your
appearance, gait, speech pattern, behavior or other discernible characteristic," and noting as
well that "'[vjisibility' in the literal sense in which the Board has sometimes used the term
might be relevant to the likelihood of persecution, but it is irrelevant to whether if there is
persecution it will be on the ground of group membership").
36. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting in addition that "[i]f
you are a member of a group that has been targeted ... you will take pains to avoid being
socially visible" in the literal sense); see also Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 2013 WL 518048
at **5-6 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2013) (en banc) ("[A] requirement of 'on-sight' visibility would
be inconsistent with previous BIA decisions and likely impermissible under the statute.");
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Atty. Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 605-07 (3d Cir. 2011); cf Soucek, supra
n. 21, at 341-42 (equating literal visibility with a requirement that social groups smell a
certain way, and noting that literal visibility is not required of the other four grounds for
asylum). One intriguing suggestion for a way in which courts' emphasis on literal visibility
might make sense can be drawn from Andrew B. Coan's essay Judicial Capacity and the
Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 Yale L.J. 422 (2012). Coan argues that courts are
more likely to adopt hard-edged rules in high-volume domains. Because the literal
visibility of a trait is more easily determined than the social salience of a group in a foreign
society, this analysis suggests that courts' literalist reading of social visibility might simply
be a response to the volume of immigration cases that courts face.
37. Br. of Respt., Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 2010 WL 1513110 at 13 (No. 09-830,
130 S. Ct. 3274 (2010)) (describing as "incorrect" the "premise that the BIA views its
'social visibility' criterion as requiring that members of a particular social group must
literally be visible to the naked eye" but acknowledging that statements made by lawyers
elsewhere in the Department of Justice have not always borne out the Solicitor General's
assurance, however, and so "the government's briefs and oral argument . . . may have
contributed to the confusion").
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Lawyers from the Department of Justice have drawn this
corrective distinction ever since, most recently before an en banc
panel of the Ninth Circuit.38
The most frequently repeated definition of social visibility
in the Second Circuit's case law is therefore one that diverges
subtly but significantly from the Second Circuit's reported
precedent. And notably, it diverges towards a position that the
Department of Justice-the agency charged with interpreting
and applying the Immigration and Nationality Act-has
officially disclaimed.
Nor is the Second Circuit's mistake an innocuous one. For
example, in one of Romero's progeny, Xiang Ming Jiang v.
Mukasey,39  the proposed social group-"people who are
targeted for gang violence because they are caught between rival
criminal gangs but are not protected by police in China"-was
rejected in part because "nothing in the record reflect[ed] that
[the applicant] possesse[d] any characteristics that would allow
others in Chinese society to recognize him as someone caught
between rival gangs." 40 By requiring that the person-rather
than the group-be recognizable, the Second Circuit clearly
applied the visibility requirement literally: To be a member, one
has to look a certain way.
Were this the kind of recognizability that is required, past
social groups recognized by the BIA-groups such as Cuban
homosexuals, women opposed to female genital mutilation, and
former Salvadoran police officerS4 1-would no longer pass
38. Supp. Br. of Respt. on Rehearing En Banc, Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, at 17-23
(No. 09-71571, 449 Fed. Appx. 626 (9th Cir. 2012)). Even more recently, the Department
of Homeland Security has filed a brief with the Board of Immigration Appeals urging it to
combine "social visibility" and "particularity" into a "social distinction" test. See Br. on
Remand of Dept. of Homeland Sec., In re Valdiviezo-Galdamez, at 7-8 (File No. A097
447286 (B.I.A. May 29, 2012)) (discussing current BIA standard and need for additional
clarification, arguing that "the focus should be on whether the society meaningfully
distinguishes persons with the shared characteristic from persons who do not possess the
trait," and concluding that "the individual alien applicant may, but does not necessarily
have to, be literally visually identifiable as a group member (or be otherwise identifiable by
means of other physical senses, such as by accent)").
39. 296 Fed. Appx. 166 (2d Cir. 2008).
40. Xiang Ming Jiang v. Mukasey, 296 Fed. Appx. 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2008). Just two
sentences earlier, however, the court invoked the other, non-literal interpretation of social
visibility: "Jiang must also show that the group he describes is generally perceived as a
discrete group by Chinese society." Id.
41. See C-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 955.
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muster.42 The immigration judge who ruled that an applicant
was not part of a socially visible group because "it is unlikely
that anyone would be able to tell from looking at him that he is
HIV positive" provides a cautionary lesson.43 None of the
Second Circuit's cases has yet rejected an asylum claim solely
because the applicant did not look a certain way. But because
BIA decisions are themselves nearly always unpublished, it is
impossible to know how the BIA applies the Second Circuit's
formulation of the test once a case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the court's unpublished opinion.4
Viewed together, the Second Circuit's social-group cases
show that the Circuit's two most important "precedents" in this
area are not its two initial published opinions on the topic, but
two unpublished, and thus largely unknown, decisions. Neither
has ever been explicitly quoted or cited, but those two summary
orders' gloss on the meaning of visibility has been copied and
pasted into sixteen of the Circuit's thirty-six opinions on the
subject. None of the court's other opinions on the topic has
proven even nearly so influential.
V. COPY-PASTE PRECEDENT
It is easy to imagine how copy-paste precedent arises.
Unpublished opinions are an efficiency mechanism-a way of
dispensing more quickly with cases that supposedly break no
42. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of "Social Visibility" in
Defining a "Particular Social Group" and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related
to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 47 (2008).
43. See Rodriguez v. Atty. Gen., 381 Fed. Appx. 217, 219 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming on
other grounds, but neither disturbing nor even commenting on the immigration judge's
interpretation of the social-visibility requirement).
44. It is also impossible to know the extent to which immigration judges and asylum
officers rely on their circuits' unpublished case law in reaching their decisions. A further
worry stems from appellate courts' tendency to reach back to their unpublished case law
when writing published opinions. For two particularly relevant examples concerning social
groups, see Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2012) ("Whether or
not the BIA's 'particularity' and 'social visibility' requirements for defining membership in
a 'particular social group' are valid, is an issue of first impression in this circuit. However,
we do not come to this issue with a blank slate, as numerous unpublished decisions in this
circuit have previously relied on the BIA's interpretation."), and Gashi, 702 F.3d 130
(discussed in n. 63, infra).
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new legal ground.45 In this context, copying and pasting makes
sense. Creativity is understandably frowned upon when an
opinion's only goal is to apply established law to the facts of a
case and communicate the result to the parties involved.46
This efficiency rationale is especially 4redominant in the
immigration context, where the case surge of the last decade
prompted the Second Circuit to institute a Non-Argument
Calendar and hire additional staff attornes to draft summary
orders for its judges to review and sign.4  Given the Circuit's
push to deal more briskly with its immigration caseload,
recycling text from previous opinions is practically unavoidable.
Even so, the text copied into unpublished opinions is
presumably meant to come from precedential opinions, not other
unpublished opinions.49
45. Until their most recent revision, the Second Circuit's Local Rules prefaced the
Circuit's policy about summary orders with the observation that "[tihe demands of
contemporary case loads require the court to be conscious of the need to utilize judicial
time effectively." See 2d Cir. Loc. R. 32.1(a) (2009) (superseded).
46. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1178 ("An unpublished disposition is, more or less, a letter from
the court to parties familiar with the facts, announcing the result and the essential rationale
of the court's decision.").
47. See John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 13, 14 n. 2
(2006) ("(T]he Second Circuit received 2360 petitions for review [of BIA decisions]
between April 1, 1972 and April 1, 2002; it received 7723 petitions for review between
April 1, 2002 and October 1, 2005.") Streamlining procedures enacted at the BIA in 2002
both increased the number of cases decided by that agency each year and led to an increase
in the percentage of those cases appealed to the federal courts of appeals. See id. at 20; see
also Stacy Caplow, After the Flood: The Legacy of the "Surge" of Federal Immigration
Appeals, 7 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Policy 1, 11 (2012) (noting that the Second Circuit received
184 immigration appeals in 2001, 2632 in 2004, and 2865 in 2008).
48. See generally Jon 0. Newman, The Second Circuit's Expedited Adjudication of
Asylum Cases: A Case Study of a Judicial Response to an Unprecedented Problem of
Caseload Management, 74 Brooklyn L. Rev. 429 (2009). For a detailed and scathing
discussion of the areas of law in which appellate courts are most prone to rely on staff
attorneys, see Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff
Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (2007).
49. The point of precedential opinions, after all, is that they are written to be followed
in similar cases. One of the greatest values of a system of precedent-a system that, it
should be said, is a relatively recent innovation in the long history of the common law, see
Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 659-62 (1999) (discussing early history of
precedent-based legal system)-is its contribution to efficient adjudication. See e.g.
Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Toward a Theory of Legal Justification,
72-73 (Stanford U. Press 1961); Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process,
149 (Yale U. Press 1921) ("[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking
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Copy-paste precedent originates in unpublished opinions
and perpetuates itself through other unpublished opinions. Thus,
it differs from ordinary precedent in two troubling ways: It
arises unintentionally and it operates surreptitiously. Those
writing unpublished opinions have no way of knowing in
advance that their text might get reused, eventually acquiring the
influence of regular precedent. And when it does-when later
unpublished opinions copy language from an earlier unpublished
opinion-the later opinions do not, because they cannot,
acknowledge their source.
Copying text that was not written with the intention that it
be copied presents an obvious danger: The copied text may not
have been crafted with the same care afforded to opinions
intended as precedential. 0 But the clandestine aspect of copy-
paste precedent gives rise to even deeper problems. For one, it
exacerbates the charge, made against unpublished opinions in
general, that they fly under the radar, attempting to avoid
review. When it comes to copy-paste precedent, not only do
individual opinions fly under the radar, but their cumulative
effect-the expanding influence some opinions attain through
copying and pasting-remains almost completely obscured.
Without citations linking each unpublished opinion back to the
unpublished source of the language it contains, identifying copy-
paste precedent is no easy task. Discovering examples would
require either database searches capable of identifying repeated
non-quoted text or else a detailed familiarity with precisely that
set of cases that otherwise gets the least attention in scholarly
literature: unpublished summary orders. This likely explains
point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's
own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone
before him."); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 599 (1987); but see Earl
Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 367, 370 (1988) ("In essence, the
argument for efficiency is based on the proposition that it is better to decide cases quickly
than correctly.").
50. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1177 ("Writing a precedential opinion ... is a solemn judicial act
that sets the course of the law for hundreds or thousands of litigants and potential litigants.
When properly done, it is an exacting and extremely time-consuming task. . . . It goes
without saying that few, if any, appellate courts have the resources to write precedential
opinions in every case that comes before them."). For a discussion of what the rule of law
requires of judges writing a precedential opinion (as opposed to judges following one), see
Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 Mich. L.
Rev. 1, 14 (2012) (suggesting a requirement that judges issue opinions, state reasons, and
try to articulate the bases of their holdings as general norms).
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most scholars' apparent failure even to notice copy-paste
precedent, and it poses an obstacle for further study as well.
Yet the problems stemming from the opacity of copy-paste
precedent are not only, or even primarily, external. The lack of
transparency affects the internal workings of courts as well.
Because the links that bind copy-paste precedent to the opinions
that follow it are unseen, courts have less incentive and
diminished ability to correct mistakes perpetuated by copy-past
precedent even when they are discovered. Consider Romero:
Were judges on the Second Circuit to receive a staff attorney's
draft order containing the Romero text, they would be unlikely
to notice its subtle error, in part because of the lessened attention
given to unpublished opinions.5 1
But even if a particularly discerning judge took issue with
the text and revised it, this would do nothing to solve the larger
problem. The summary order in that case would be improved,
but Romero would remain as copy-pasteable as ever. Because
the draft opinion copied and pasted Romero without citing it, the
judge correcting the draft opinion would not feel any need to
discuss or distinguish Romero, thereby limiting or correcting its
holding. In effect, the court would have refused to follow a
precedent without realizing it was doing so-and thus, without
overruling the prior decision. For this reason, paradoxically,
copy-paste precedent is, as a practical matter, harder to overrule
than real precedent.
On a more theoretical level, copy-paste precedent, by
operating covertly, sacrifices most of the values that make
genuine precedent worthwhile. Adhering to precedent is said to
give stability to the law and to allow those governed by the law52to rely on its provisions. Precedent serves to provide notice of
what the law is. "[I]t fosters the appearance of certainty and
51. Allowing judges to give some cases less attention than others is, recall, among the
primary reasons for having unpublished opinions in the first place. See nn. 46-47, supra,
and accompanying text.
52. See Planned Parenthood of SE. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[T]he
very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity
over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable."); see also Larry
Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1989) (discussing
reliance value); Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=2087803 (June 19, 2012) (accessed Jan. 21, 2013; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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impartiality by providing a seemingly neutral source of authoritv
to which judges can appeal in order to justify their decisions."
It also helps to ensure that like cases will be treated alike.54
Copy-paste precedent does none of these things. Because no one
realizes when copying and pasting is happening, the stability
that copy-paste precedent provides to the law-the stability of
repetition-does nothing to give notice, promote reliance, foster
courts' legitimacy, or assure fairness. It only serves the one
remaining value of precedent: efficiency.
Given these many differences between genuine precedent
and copy-paste precedent, perhaps the latter should not be called
a type of precedent at all. In a literal sense, the term is
misplaced. After all, the hallmark of a precedential holding is
that, barring special circumstances,5 5  it must be followed
whether or not the judges who follow it would have come to the
same decision themselves. 56 Precedent is thus a compelled
repetition of a holding previously reached, and that compulsion
springs from the values just canvassed: rule of law, reliance,
fairness, legitimacy, and efficiency. Copy-paste precedent can
be seen as a type of precedent (or something closely analogous)
only insofar as its efficiency value is weighty enough to compel
courts to follow it. The compulsion of copy-paste precedent is
thus more akin to physical than to moral necessity: Even if
courts are not institutionally bound to follow it, the pressures of
handling what judges perceive as crushing caseloads57  may
53, Maltz, supra n. 49, at 371 (italics in original); see also Lee, supra n. 49, at 652-53
(reviewing benefits of certainty); see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986)
("[S]tare decisis ... permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the
law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of
our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.").
54. The "equality value" of precedent is critically discussed in Alexander, supra n. 52,
at 12-14.
55. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55.
56. See Alexander, supra n. 52, at 4.
57. See generally Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (2011)
(examining the impact of federal appellate courts' "immense" workloads on case
outcomes). Perceptions of what constitutes a crushing workload are context dependent,
however; for example, judges in the state courts of general jurisdiction handle an average
of 1,800 new cases each year. See Robert C. LaFountain, Richard Schauffler, Shauna M.
Strickland, Sarah A. Gibson & Ashley N. Mason, Examining the Work of State Courts: An
Analysis of 2009 State Court Caseloads, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/CSP
2009.aspx at 5 (Nati. Ctr. for St. Cts. 2011) (accessed January 29, 2013; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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make them feel compelled to follow copy-paste precedent with a
fidelity approaching that which they accord genuine precedent.
Following copy-paste precedent has the benefit of speeding
up adjudication with few or no costs to the author, given the
obscurity in which its use occurs. Even so, however, the
efficiency gains of copy-paste precedent deserve a second
look.58 For a staff attorney assigned the task of writing yet
another summary order on social groups, it is of course more
efficient to copy and paste text from a case like Romero than to
cobble together an original paragraph that sets forth the relevant
legal standard. (This, it should be noted, is not unique to
appellate courts or their staff attorneys. In the federal district
courts, 59 it is quite common for a judge to borrow liberally from
his or her own previous opinions; readers can easily find
paragraphs stating, say, the standard for summary judgment,
qualified immunity, or McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
repeated verbatim in a given judge's many opinions employing
those standards. This is often done tacitly, and for good reason:
Because district-court opinions do not have precedential value, 60
it makes no sense for district judges to quote and cite
themselves. No principle becomes more correct just because the
same judge says it twice.)
Having noted the obvious fact that it is quicker to copy-
paste than to write afresh, it is important for me to observe
another equally obvious point: that it is no less quick to copy
and paste correct text than it is to copy text based on a mistaken
understanding of the law. Efficiency may dictate that later cases
copy and paste text from earlier cases, but it does not explain
58. For a critique of efficiency arguments made in favor of unpublished opinions in
general, see Kenneth F. Hunt, Student Author, Saving Time or Killing Time: How the Use
of Unpublished Opinions Accelerates the Drain on Federal Judicial Resources, 61
Syracuse L. Rev. 315, 330-35 (2011).
59. Professor Levin has critiqued the prevalence of what he calls "unpublication" in the
federal district courts. According to Levin, only three percent of federal district-court
orders in which some matter is decided are included on Westlaw or LEXIS. See Hillel Y.
Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 973, 985
(2008).
60. See e.g. Camreta v. Greene, _US _ ,.S. 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n. 7 (2011)
("'A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different
judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different
case."' (quoting Lawrence B. Solum, Stare Decisis in United States Courts, in 18 Moore's
Federal Practice § 134.02[l][d] (3d ed. 2011))).
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why those earlier cases are themselves wrong. Surely the author
of Romero did not save much time by paraphrasing the legal
standard for social-group visibility rather than quoting it directly
from one of the Circuit's precedential opinions. That is to say,
the efficiency gained by copying and pasting-the sole
justification for copy-paste precedent-should not be compared
with a system in which judges or clerks or staff attorneys have to
begin each opinion from scratch. The more relevant comparison
is how much the use of copy-paste precedent increases
efficiency relative to the ordinary system of precedent, in which
prior precedential decisions are explicitly quoted and cited.61
This points to one modest suggestion for reform: Courts
should refrain from releasing unpublished opinions when the
governing legal principle either is not, or cannot be, quoted
directly from a precedential opinion. When courts cannot do
that, there may be reason to believe that their unpublished
opinions are actually making new law-whether intentionally
or, as in cases like Romero, unintentionally. In cases like that,
courts would do better to pause and produce real precedent,
rather than take the chance that copy-paste precedent will
continue to replicate.
Of course, relying exclusively on published opinions will
not eliminate error. Errors occur in precedential decisions too,
and these are sometimes repeated in subsequent cases without
anyone's noticing the original mistake. 62 So while I have pointed
out a recurring substantive mistake in the line of immigration
cases discussed here, the more worrisome mistake-the one
common to all copy-paste precedent-is not substantive but
procedural.
Copy-paste precedent, as I have said, lacks most of the
justifications that support regular precedent. It does not promote
61. Copy-paste precedent does have one dubious efficiency advantage over ordinary
precedent: Because parties do not generally know that copy-paste precedent exists-and
are certainly not compelled to cite it-they do not have to devote time to researching these
potentially relevant precedents, thereby avoiding one of the inefficiencies sometimes
attributed to a system of stare decisis. See e.g. Waldron, supra n. 50, at 3 (describing the
"immense" research efforts required of lawyers and judges in a precedent-based judicial
system).
62. For an excellent example, see Adam D. Chandler, Student Author, Puerto Rico's
Eleventh Amendment Status Anxiety, 120 Yale L.J. 2183, 2191 (2011) (describing the First
Circuit's case law on Puerto Rico's Eleventh Amendment immunity as the product of a
"judicial game of 'telephone').
170
COPY-PASTE PRECEDENT
reliance, or legitimacy, or equality. Its contributions to
efficiency are likely overestimated, at least in comparison to
ordinary precedent. And as for giving notice of what the law
requires, copy-paste precedent does not lack just that particular
virtue, it actually subverts it. Copy-paste precedent is not openly
acknowledged, so litigants are left in the dark as to the legal
tests that will probably govern their cases, even while copy-
paste precedent is, in fact, shaping the course of future law.
When a court's most frequently used statement of law on a
given topic is one that has no binding force, litigants have no
idea that this is the test they are supposed to meet or argue
against. Asylum applicants, never having heard of Romero,
cannot know that the Romero test is the one the Second Circuit
is most likely to use in determining whether their social group is
visible enough for their applications to succeed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Romero and the decisions that have copied and pasted its
text suggest that to qualify as a social group, asylees must share
a trait that is visible to society at large. This is wrong. But the
deeper wrong is that the Second Circuit's case law on this
subject is guided by a system of "precedent" that is itself not
visible. Copy-paste precedent has avoided visibility in both of
the senses described above: Before now, it has not been
recognized or understood, and even now, it operates in ways
63
almost entirely unseen.
An asylum seeker with a well-founded fear of persecution
may have good reason to stay out of the public eye. The
precedent that guides courts' decisions does not.
63. Well after this essay was submitted for publication, a sixth precedential opinion
discussing social-group visibility was issued by the Second Circuit. In Gashi v. Holder,
702 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit held that the common characteristic
shared by a group's members "must have enough 'social visibility' that it identifies
members of the group to others in the community, particularly to potential persecutors."
This language is partly a paste and partly a close paraphrase of the relevant language from
Xiao Fen Lian. See supra n. 34 and accompanying text. Gashi thus provides a fascinating
instance of copy-paste precedent becoming real precedent. Although its description of
identifying characteristics may suggest a literalist reading of visibility, this did not keep the
Gashi court from finding that witnesses known to have cooperated with war crimes
investigators in Kosovo comprise a cognizable social group.
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